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 1 
A Curious Motion: 
The Uncertain Role of Anti-SLAPP Statutes in Federal Courts 
By Markus A. Brazill* 
With the emergence of online review sites such as Yelp and TripAdvisor, an unsurprising 
byproduct has been a spate of defamation lawsuits against those who write critical reviews 
online. A Washington Post article, for example, describes how a Maryland woman faced a sixty-
five-thousand-dollar defamation lawsuit after she wrote a negative review about a dog obedience 
class she purchased.1 Similarly, a Colorado man found himself confronting a one-hundred-and-
twenty-five thousand dollar suit after he posted a Yelp review castigating a home remodeling 
contractor for the work the contractor performed on his home.2 For some, these suits are but the 
latest example of “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (SLAPP), suits aimed at 
suppressing legitimate speech or petitioning activity through the financial and psychological tolls 
of litigation.3 Others argue that some of these reviews can be appallingly inaccurate and 
devastating for small businesses that rely on their good standing on these websites.4 
Putting aside the merit of these suits, the attention that they have generated has renewed 
public interest in so-called “anti-SLAPP” statutes, a broad term used to describe measures aimed 
at curbing suits that deter public participation. Within the past five years, many states have 
enacted robust anti-SLAPP statutes, and Yelp has become one of the leading proponents of a 
                                                 
* I would like to thank the Civil Procedure faculty of the University of Pennsylvania Law School—in particular my 
former professors Catherine Struve, Tobias Barrington Wolff, Judge Anthony Scirica, and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.—
for instilling in their students an appreciation for the instrumental role that civil procedure has played in the 
development of the law and the pursuit of justice. I would also like to thank Adam Barry for sparking my interest in 
this topic and my family for its enduring love and support. All views expressed, as well as all errors and omissions, 
are my own. 
1 Justin Jouvenal, Negative Yelp, Angie’s List Reviews Prompt Dog Obedience Business to Sue, WASH. POST (Mar. 
25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/negative-yelp-review-of-dog-obedience-class-spurs-
lawsuit/2015/03/25/eb92dab6-d183-11e4-8fce-3941fc548f1c_story.html. 
2 Josh Harkinson, Yelp Is Pushing a Law to Shield Its Reviewers from Defamation Suits, MOTHER JONES (Jul. 20, 
2015), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/07/yelp-slapp-lawsuit-legislation-speak-free-act. 
3 See id. 
4 See Kathleen Miles and Lily Mihalik, The Yelp Wars: False Reviews, Slander and Anti-SLAPP – What’s Ethical in 
Online Reviewing?, KPCC (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.scpr.org/programs/patt-morrison/2011/08/25/20426/ 
yelpamazonfakereviewcitysearchtripadvisorantislapp/. 
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proposed federal anti-SLAPP statute called the SPEAK FREE Act of 2015.5 The federal 
legislation—the first of its kind to garner bipartisan support—is closely modeled after tough anti-
SLAPP statutes enacted in jurisdictions such as California, Texas, and the District of Columbia, 
that offer defendants the right to file a special “anti-SLAPP” motion to challenge the legal and 
factual merit of a plaintiff’s cause of action.6 
While “Yelpers” can certainty avail themselves of the protections afforded by robust anti-
SLAPP measures, these statutes sweep much more broadly. To give an example, California’s 
anti-SLAPP statute has generated over four thousand published opinions7 and has become a 
highly popular procedural device for defendants to dismiss claims ranging from appropriation of 
likeness8 to disability discrimination.9 Because of the strategic benefits provided by these 
statutes, defendants have tried to utilize state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court diversity 
proceedings as well, but two principal obstacles have troubled their application: First, an 
exceptionally robust anti-SLAPP statute could impinge upon a party’s Seventh Amendment right 
to a jury trial. And, second, these anti-SLAPP statutes may directly conflict with various 
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This essay will examine how moderate anti-SLAPP motions probably pose no Seventh 
Amendment concerns but could more credibly be in direct conflict with Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12 and 56. Part I will briefly consider the constitutional roots of anti-SLAPP motions 
in the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and provide an overview of how an anti-SLAPP statute such as 
California’s functions. Part II will argue that an anti-SLAPP statute could be modeled after a 
heightened pleadings standard or summary judgment proceeding without violating the Seventh 
                                                 
5 Harkinson, supra note 2; SPEAK FREE Act of 2015, H.R. 2304, 114th Cong. (2015), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2304/text [hereinafter SPEAK FREE Act of 2015] 
6 SPEAK FREE Act of 2015, supra note 5. 
7 See Michael C. Denison, SLAPP Happy Courts Continued to Refine the Reach of the Anti-SLAPP Law in 
Numerous Decisions in 2010, L.A. LAWYER, June 2011, at 21. 
8 See, e.g., Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98 (2010). 
9 See, e.g., Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. CNN, Inc., 742 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 3 
Amendment. Focusing on California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Part III will argue that an anti-SLAPP 
motion may conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF AN ANTI-SLAPP MOTION 
A. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
In two antitrust decisions, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight10 and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington11 the Supreme Court established 
what would later be known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, a nearly-absolute immunity for 
petitioning the government. Noerr and Pennington held that an individual is immune from 
antitrust liability for petitioning efforts, even if her actions are aimed at encouraging the 
government to adopt anticompetitive regulation.12 But Noerr suggested a possible exception to 
this immunity if the petitioning efforts were “a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more 
than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”13 This 
possible “sham” petitioning exception to Noerr immunity was confirmed in California Motor 
Transportation Company v. Trucking Unlimited,14 in which the Court denied Noerr-Pennington 
immunity to a consortium of trucking companies that filed various state and federal actions in an 
attempt to block a rival group of trucking companies from acquiring and transferring highway 
carriage licenses.15 Yet California Motor Transportation Company did not explicate a precise 
standard for determining what constitutes “sham” petitioning.16 
This uncertainty over what qualifies as a “sham” was largely resolved by two Supreme 
Court decisions in the early 1990s. In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,17 the Court 
                                                 
10 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
11 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
12 Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 138; Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665. California Motor Transportation 
Company v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), clarified that efforts to seek redress from any branch of 
government constituted protected petitioning. Id. at 510. 
13 365 U.S. at 144. 
14 404 U.S. 508 (1972). 
15 See id. at 509, 515. 
16 Id. at 510. 
17 499 U.S. 365 (1991). 
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clarified that an entity can be held liable only if she uses the petition process itself in an 
anticompetitive manner; merely lobbying a government body in favor of anticompetitive 
regulation is not actionable.18 And to determine what constitutes a “sham” lawsuit, the Court in 
Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries,19 established a two-part test: 
First, the petitioning “must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits.”20 Second, after demonstrating that the lawsuit is 
objectively unfounded, a party seeking to overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity must prove that 
the suit was brought with the subjective intent of using the litigation process in an 
anticompetitive manner.21 
On what constitutes “petitioning,” the Court has made clear that the doctrine is broad 
enough to cover communications with each of the three branches of government22 but the Court 
has refused to delineate clear boundaries, leaving the doctrine’s applicability to “indirect” 
petitioning or conduct “incidental” to petitioning uncertain. In Allied Tube & Conduit 
Corporation v. Indian Head, Inc.,23 the Court concluded that a company’s unseemly efforts to 
influence the decision-making process of a private standard-setting organization were not 
“petitioning” activities protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity.24 Although the organization 
developed the standard with the intent to encourage various legislative bodies to adopt it, the 
Court held that the applicability of Noerr-Pennington immunity depends in part on “the context 
and nature of the activity,” which, given the makeup of private standard-setting organizations 
and the well-established practice of subjecting them to antirust scrutiny, counseled against 
                                                 
18 Id. at 380. 
19 508 U.S. 49 (1993). 
20 Id. at 60. 
21 Id. at 61. 
22 California Motor Transp. Co., 404 U.S. at 510. 
23 486 U.S. 492 (1988). 
24 See id. at 510-11. 
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affording Noerr-Pennington immunity.25 The Court acknowledged that differentiating between 
immunized “anticompetitive political activity” and unprotected “anticompetitive commercial 
activity” that has a “political impact” is “admittedly difficult,” but that no clearer line could be 
drawn.26 
Despite the flurry of developments culminating in Omni Outdoor Advertising and 
Professional Real Estate Investors, the Court has left unresolved the applicability of Noerr-
Pennington immunity outside of antitrust law. A few Supreme Court decisions—particularly Bill 
Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,27 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Company,28 and BE & K 
Construction Company v. NLRB29—suggest that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine extends beyond 
the antitrust laws, and lower appellate courts have applied Noerr-Pennington to causes of action 
ranging from RICO violations to constitutional torts.30 Some critics, however, counter that the 
generous immunity afforded by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine should be understood as a 
reflection of the limited applicability of the antitrust laws to “political” (as opposed to 
“economic”) conduct.31 For these commentators, Noerr-Pennington should not be applied as a 
trans-substantive standard, and whatever protection the Petition Clause by its own force affords 
is more limited.32 
This alternative interpretation finds some support in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health 
& Fitness, Inc.,33 in which the Court recently rebuffed the Federal Circuit’s efforts to import the 
Noerr-Pennington standard into the determination of attorney’s fees under the Patent Act. 
Octane Fitness concluded that, “[t]o the extent that patent suits are . . . protected as acts of 
                                                 
25 See id. at 499-502. 
26 Id. at 511 n.10. 
27 461 U.S. 731 (1983) 
28 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
29 536 U.S. 516 (2002). 
30 Craig Drachtman, Taking on Patent Trolls: The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine’s Extension to Pre-Lawsuit Demand 
Letters and Its Sham Litigation Exception, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 229, 241-42 (2015). 
31 See generally Michael Pemstein, The Basis for Noerr-Pennington Immunity: An Argument That Federal Antitrust 
Law, Not the First Amendment, Defines the Boundaries of Noerr-Pennington, 40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 79 (2014). 
32 See id. at 112-13. 
33 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
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petitioning,” the risk of fee-shifting would not as grievously chill the right to petition as treble 
damages under the antitrust laws. While there is scarce reliable data about district courts’ 
average attorney’s fee awards, the Court’s assertion that a multi-million dollar attorney’s fee 
award34 would not chill such activity as much as the (much-more improbable) prospect of a 
trebled antitrust judgment seems tenuous. That Octane Fitness forced such a distinction appears 
to signal the Court’s reticence with applying Noerr-Pennington’s robust protections universally. 
This, coupled with Octane Fitness’s recognition that the degree of protection afforded outside of 
immunity from antitrust liability remains unsettled,35 suggests that the lower courts’ expansive 
reading of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine may be unwarranted. 
B. Anti-SLAPP Statutes 
Inspired by the Supreme Court’s buttressing of Noerr-Pennington immunity, Professors 
Penelope Canan and George W. Pring coined the term “strategic lawsuit against public 
participation” (SLAPP) in a 1988 article to describe suits they believed were brought with the 
intent of “preventing citizens from exercising their political rights or punishing those who have 
done so.“36 Specifically, Canan and Pring focused on instances where individuals or non-profit 
organizations were sued for activity that the authors thought should be protected by the Petition 
Clause of the First Amendment, such as reporting violations of regulations to government 
agencies or speaking at public hearings.37 Although the vast majority of these suits prove 
unsuccessful, the authors contended that bringing them could nevertheless advantage plaintiffs 
by inflicting economic and psychological costs on their targets, diverting attention and resources 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., Synthia Ford, Attorney Fees Becoming More Common in Patent Cases, LITIG. NEWS (Jan. 26, 2016), 
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/012616-patent-case-attorney-fees.html (describing 
a district court order granting 4.1 million dollars in attorney’s fees). 
35 See Octane Fitness, LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1757 (stating, after describing the Noerr-Pennington standard, “to the 
extent that patent suits are similarly protected as acts of petitioning,” that the sham exception requirements did not 
apply). 
36 Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Political Participation, 35 SOC. PROBS. 506, 506 
(1988); Thomas A. Waldman, Comment, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First Amendment Law and in the Courts’ 
Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979, 981 n.3, 983 (1992). 
37 See Canan & Pring, supra note 36, at 508-09. 
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away from the defendants’ petitioning activity and deterring others from engaging in similar 
efforts.38 
The concept soon gained traction in legal journals, and state legislatures began to 
formulate mechanisms to address “SLAPPs.”39 Becoming the first state to pass what would later 
be termed an “anti-SLAPP statute,” Washington adopted a statute in 1989 that extended Noerr-
Pennington immunity to all communications with the government on issues “reasonably of 
concern.”40 
Three years later, California passed its own anti-SLAPP measure, but it chose a much-
different tack, developing what would later serve as a model for other states. The main provision 
of California’s anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to file “a special motion to strike,” if the 
“cause of action . . . aris[es] from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of 
petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in 
connection with a public issue.”41 Upon the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion—which must be 
done within sixty days of service of a complaint, or with good cause, at any time later in the 
suit—all discovery is automatically stayed, and a plaintiff must demonstrate good cause to 
dissolve the stay.42 The trial court must hold a hearing on an anti-SLAPP-motion within thirty 
days of service of the motion, unless the court’s caseload prevents such a speedy resolution.43 
In making an anti-SLAPP motion, the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating 
that the cause of action “arise[s] from” activity conducted “in furtherance of the person’s right of 
petition or free speech.”44 In response to concerns raised during the legislative process by the 
California Judges Association that this broad standard could permit the filing of anti-SLAPP 
                                                 
38 See Canan & Pring, supra note 36, at 514-15. 
39 See generally Waldman, supra note 32. 
40 Tom Wyrwich, A Cure for A "Public Concern": Washington's New Anti-SLAPP Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 663, 669 
(2011). 
41 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a) (West). 
42 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(f), (g) (West). 
43 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(g) (West). 
44 Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685, 694 (2002) (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 
425.16(b)(1)). 
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motions in nearly every case,45 the anti-SLAPP bill was amended to incorporate a four-part 
definition of protected activity.46 The first two prongs address conduct conceivably protected by 
the Petition Clause, namely any communication made in or “in connection with” a government 
proceeding.47 “In connection with” is interpreted to encompass only communications incidental 
to a government proceeding (such as pre-suit demand letters) rather than covering any 
communication made about a government proceeding.48 The third prong covers some 
communications that are protected by the Free Speech Clause but not the Petition Clause, namely 
conduct made in a public forum on “an issue of public interest.”49 Finally, the fourth definitional 
clause protects conduct made “in furtherance of” activity protected by the Free Speech Clause 
and Petition Clause on an issue of public interest.50 Although a literal reading of the statute 
suggests the statutory definition is non-exhaustive, California’s courts have limited the anti-
SLAPP motion’s applicability to the four categories explicitly included.51 
 If a defendant demonstrates that the plaintiff’s cause of action arises from protected 
activity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate “a probability” of success in her cause of 
action.52 An early draft of California’s anti-SLAPP legislation required “a substantial 
probability,” but the final bill omitted “substantial” out of concern that the statute would 
otherwise violate Article I, Section 16 of the California Constitution,53 which guarantees the 
right to a jury trial in both criminal and civil cases.54 This second step in an anti-SLAPP motion 
requires an examination of the legal and factual adequacy of all elements of a plaintiff’s cause of 
                                                 
45 Jerome I. Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of Petition in California, 32 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 965, 1003 (1999). 
46 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e) (West) 
47 Id. 
48 Anderson v. Geist, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 286, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). 
49 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e) (West). 
50 Id. 
51 Hardin v. PDX, Inc., 227 Cal. App. 4th 159, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), as modified on denial of reh’g (July 21, 
2014), review denied (Sept. 24, 2014). 
52 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1) (West). 
53 See Braun, supra note 45, at 1002. 
54 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
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action; the motion is not limited to determining whether California’s statutory analog to Noerr-
Pennington immunity applies or whether a plaintiff can show a probability of satisfying New 
York Times Company v. Sullivan’s actual malice standard. A court will also consider any 
applicable affirmative defenses, though the California Courts of Appeal disagree over which 
party bears the burden of proof.55 
 If a plaintiff cannot demonstrate a probability of success, the claim is ordinarily 
dismissed, but a court can grant leave to amend if the plaintiff can submit new allegations or 
evidence to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits.56 Unlike an ordinary demurrer, a 
decision on an anti-SLAPP motion—regardless of whether the motion is granted or denied—is 
immediately appealable as a final order.57 A court must award a prevailing defendant attorney’s 
fees and costs, but a prevailing plaintiff is only so entitled if the anti-SLAPP motion was 
“frivolous or . . . solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.”58 
 Displeased with commercial businesses regularly taking advantage of the anti-SLAPP 
statute, the California State Legislature amended the statute in 2003 to prevent a defendant from 
filing an anti-SLAPP motion if the suit is “brought solely in the public interest” or relates to 
commercial speech.59 But the 2003 amendments create an exemption allowing members of the 
press, those involved in the creation of artistic works, and nonprofits to utilize the anti-SLAPP 
statute.60 
 Although twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted some form of 
anti-SLAPP statute,61 California’s is one of the broadest, comparable only to those found in a 
                                                 
55 No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 1029 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
56 Nguyen-Lam v. Cao, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 217 (2009). 
57 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(i) (West). 
58 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)(1) (West). 
59 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.17 (West). 
60 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.17(c), (d) (West). 
61 State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-
protection/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2015). 
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few states, such as Texas,62 Maine,63 Nevada,64 and the District of Columbia.65 A few less 
sweeping anti-SLAPP statutes require only that the plaintiff demonstrate that the First 
Amendment or an analogous statutory immunity will not preclude a cause of action.66 Others, 
such as Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP statute, apply only when a defendant has been sued for 
communicating with government agencies on certain topics, such as environmental regulation.67 
New York’s anti-SLAPP statute is particularly unavailing as it applies only if the cause of action 
arises out of public commentary on government permitting.68 
II. THE ANTI-SLAPP MOTION AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
The scope of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial has been traditionally 
delineated by examining English conventions as of 1791 (the year the Seventh Amendment was 
adopted), an approach called the “historical test.”69 This emphasis on English historical practice 
can be traced to United States v. Wonsan, in which Justice Story, while riding circuit, remarked: 
Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to [in the Seventh 
Amendment] is not the common law of any individual state, (for it probably 
differs in all), but it is the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our 
jurisprudence. It cannot be necessary for me to expound the grounds of this 
opinion, because they must be obvious to every person acquainted with the 
history of the law.70 
 
At least one scholar, however, argues that the Court did not fully articulate the historical test 
until much later in Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman.71 She argues that Wonson should be 
viewed as addressing only the Reexamination Clause and that the decision did not pinpoint any 
                                                 
62 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001 et seq. (West). 
63 Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 556 et seq. 
64 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.660 et seq. (West). 
65 D.C. Code Ann. § 16-5502 et seq. (West). 
66 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 554.02 et seq. (West). 
67 See, e.g., Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8301 et seq. (West). 
68 N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 76-a(1)(a) (McKinney). 
69 Charles E. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 639–640 
(1973); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). 
70 United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (No. 16,750) (CC Mass. 1812), Wolfram, supra note 69 at 641. 
71 Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 188 (2000); see generally Baltimore & Carolina Line v. 
Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935). 
 11 
particular moment in time at which the right to a jury trial should be assessed.72 Then again, 
Justice Story’s reasoning in Wonson seems to interpret the Seventh Amendment more broadly, 
and he probably thought it unnecessary to mention an exact date because English practice had 
not substantively changed between 1791 and 1812.73 Either way, at least since Redman, the 
historical approach has been the clear predominant method for interpreting the Seventh 
Amendment.74 
Despite the seeming applicability of the historical test to both questions, the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on what causes of action or issues fall within the scope of the Seventh 
Amendment markedly deviates from its determinations about the permissibility of gatekeeping 
procedures.75 The Supreme Court has interpreted broadly the types of suits or issues that 
implicate the Seventh Amendment, finding that the jury trial right attaches to actions brought for 
housing discrimination under Title VII of the Fair Housing Act,76 fraudulent conveyance (even 
when adjudicated in bankruptcy court),77 breaches of the duty of fair representation,78 statutory 
damages under the Copyright Act,79 and unconstitutional takings brought under section 1983.80 
As applied, the historical test often yields comparisons made at such a high degree of abstraction 
that history may not serve as a meaningful guide; for example, in Chauffeurs, Teamsters & 
Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, the majority and dissent vigorously disputed whether a cause of 
action for breach of a union’s duty of fair representation is more akin to an action brought in 
1791 for legal malpractice or against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty.81 In a closely-related 
                                                 
72 See id. at 188-90. 
73 Wolfram, supra note 69, at 641. 
74 See Moses, supra note 71, at 188. 
75 Joan E. Schaffner, The Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial: The Supreme Court Giveth and the 
Supreme Court Taketh Away, 31 BAL. L. REV. 225 (2002). 
76 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974). 
77 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 63 (1989). 
78 Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 573 (U.S. 1990). 
79 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998). 
80 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 721 (1999). 
81 See generally 494 U.S. 558, 565-69, 585-88 (1990). 
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line of cases, beginning in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,82 the Court has held that, after the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged courts of law and equity, a jury trial must take 
precedence over equitable proceedings to protect the right against issue or claim preclusion.83 
True, in Parklane Hosiery Company v. Shore,84 the Court recast the Beacon Theatres line of 
cases as “enunciating no more than a general prudential rule,”85 but the Court has not 
substantially limited their holdings. 
Yet, at the same time, the Court has narrowly construed what “incidents” of a jury trial 
the Seventh Amendment protects.86 Since district courts under the Conformity Act had to apply 
the procedural rules of their forum states, the Supreme Court was repeatedly confronted with 
determining the constitutionality of exotic state procedural devices unknown at the time of the 
ratification of the Seventh Amendment. The Court concluded that most of these procedures 
satisfied the Seventh Amendment. Upholding a New Mexico Territory provision that allowed a 
court to enter a judgment contrary to a general verdict if it contradicted special interrogatories, 
the Supreme Court in Walker v. New Mexico & S. P. R. Co. remarked: 
The seventh amendment . . . does not attempt to regulate matters of pleading or 
practice, or to determine in what way issues shall be framed by which questions 
of fact are to be submitted to a jury. Its aim is not to preserve mere matters of 
form and procedure, but substance of right. This requires that questions of fact in 
common-law actions shall be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume, 
directly or indirectly, to take from the jury or to itself such prerogative. So long as 
this substance of right is preserved, the procedure by which this result shall be 
reached is wholly within the discretion of the legislature . . .87 
 
Walker, therefore, represents the Supreme Court’s first explicit acknowledgment of its narrow 
construction of what limits the Seventh Amendment imposes on gatekeeping procedures—only 
                                                 
82 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
83 Schaffner, supra note 75, at 258-61. 
84 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
85 Id. at 334. 
86 Schaffner, supra note 75, at 261. 
87 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (emphasis added). 
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the “substance of the right” to a jury trial (however that is construed) is protected.88 Following 
the reasoning of Walker, Gasoline Products Company v. Champlin Refining Company approved 
of the grant of a new trial on only the question of damages, a practice forbidden at common law, 
asserting that “the Constitution is concerned[] not with form, but with substance.”89 
 While Walker, Gasoline Products Company, and other earlier decisions seemed to 
acknowledge that the “substance” of the Seventh Amendment largely protected a party’s right to 
have a jury conduct any fact-finding, the Court embraced a more skeptical approach beginning in 
Galloway v. United States. In Galloway, the Court upheld the constitutionality of judgment as a 
matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) even though there was no analogous procedure available in 
1791.90 At the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, the two major mechanisms 
available to a trial judge to check a jury’s fact-finding were the demurrer to the evidence and the 
grant of a new trial.91 In a demurrer to the evidence, the defendant admitted every fact and 
reasonable inference offered by the plaintiff.92 A court would enter judgment in favor of the 
defendant if there were “no evidence” from which a “material fact” could be inferred.93 If the 
court found otherwise, it would instead enter judgment against the defendant.94 Rule 50(a), in 
contrast, requires a plaintiff to supply greater proof to withstand the motion and does not 
preclude a defendant from litigating the case at trial if she loses the motion. Yet Galloway 
characterized these differences as merely “incidental or collateral.”95 Adopting a much narrower 
understanding than Walker, the Court reasoned that the “[Seventh] Amendment was designed to 
preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the great 
                                                 
88 Schaffner, supra note 75, at 261. 
89 Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931). 
90 319 U.S. 372, 396 (1943). 
91 See Renée Lettow Lerner, The Rise of Directed Verdict: Jury Power in Civil Cases Before the Federal Rules of 
1938, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448, 458 (2013). 
92 Id. 
93 See, e.g., Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362, 373 (1850) (describing the standard). 
94 Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 149 (2007). 
95 Galloway, 319 U.S. at 390. 
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mass of procedural forms and details . . .”96 The Court was dismissive of even the differences in 
the standards of proof, asserting that there is no constitutional difference between requiring a 
plaintiff to provide “substantial evidence” as opposed to “some” or “any” evidence.97 Rather, the 
Court held, “the essential requirement is that mere speculation be not allowed to do duty for 
probative facts, after making due allowance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the 
party whose case is attacked.”98 
Given Galloway’s admonition that the Seventh Amendment protects “only the most 
fundamental elements” of a jury trial, it should come as no surprise that Justice Stewart, citing 
Galloway and Gasoline Products, observed in Parklane Hosiery Company, that “many 
procedural devices developed since 1791 that have diminished the civil jury’s historic domain 
have been found not to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment.”99 The right to a jury trial 
as construed by the Court is thus quite broad in its application but relatively thin in its 
protection.100 
Intriguingly, although Galloway suggested that an “essential requirement” of a Rule 50 
motion is that a court must make every reasonable inference for the nonmoving party, the Court 
has found such a practice is not constitutionally compelled when evaluating allegations in a 
complaint. In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Congress enacted a 
heightened “strong inference of scienter” pleadings standard for private 10b-5 securities lawsuits. 
In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,101 the Supreme Court concluded that a plaintiff 
can withstand a 12(b)(6) motion under the strong inference of scienter standard only if, after 
evaluating competing inferences, “a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter 
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts 
                                                 
96 Id. at 392 (emphasis added). 
97 Id. at 395. 
98 Id. 
99 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). 
100 See Schaffner, supra note 75, at 261-62, 271. 
101 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
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alleged.”102 Justifying its requirement that a court consider “plausible opposing inferences,” 
Justice Ginsburg noted that determining whether an inference is “strong” is an inherently 
comparative exercise.103 Although Tellabs—unlike Twombly—does not explicitly state that 
conclusory allegations should not be accepted as true, the opinion indicates that only “factual 
allegations” must be accepted,104 and the standard would obviously not function in practice if a 
plaintiff could merely plead a general allegation of scienter. 
In the decision below, the Seventh Circuit had refused to adopt a standard that tasked a 
court with weighing competing inferences for fear that such a procedure would violate the 
Seventh Amendment.105 The Tellabs majority rejected these concerns on three bases. Its 
principal argument was that Congress’s greater power to create statutory causes of action, 
includes the lesser power to define pleadings standards.106 Relying on its 1902 decision Fidelity 
& Deposit Company v. United States,107 the Court asserted that the PSLRA “‘simply ‘prescribes 
the means of making an issue,’ and that, when ‘[t]he issue [was] made as prescribed, the right of 
trial by jury accrues.’”108 This suggestion that pleadings standards do not implicate the Seventh 
Amendment is somewhat curious. Obviously, Congress cannot authorize courts to violate the 
Seventh Amendment; indeed, in Feltner the Court struck down a provision in the Copyright Act 
that instructed a judge to determine statutory damages.109 And, although Congress can certainly 
repeal a cause of action or condition it on the satisfaction of administrative perquisites, scholars 
have recognized that Tellabs approved of “a sort of hybrid between the motion to dismiss and the 
motion for summary judgment.”110 To survive a motion to dismiss under Tellabs, while all 
factual allegations must be accepted as true, in practice a complaint must contain detailed 
                                                 
102 Id. at 324. 
103 See id. at 323-34. 
104 Id. at 322 (emphasis added). 
105 Id. at 326. 
106 Id. at 327. 
107 187 U.S. 315 (1902). 
108 551 U.S. at 327 (quoting Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 187 U.S. at 320). 
109 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998). 
110 Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507, 532 (2009) 
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allegations with references to particular witnesses or documents incorporated by reference.111 
Thus, given that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion under Tellabs in many ways resembles summary 
judgment (which has always been considered subject to constitutional limitations), the notion 
that the “substance of the right” to a jury trial is not implicated merely because the “strong 
inference” standard is ostensibly just a pleadings rule lacks persuasive force. 
The argument also does little to explain the constitutionality of other heightened 
pleadings standards. Congress had little direct role in crafting Rule 9’s heightened pleadings 
standard, and the rule applies equally to state law causes of action, yet the Court has never 
questioned its constitutionality. In fact, the Second Circuit had crafted the strong inference of 
scienter standard before the PSLRA as a—textually questionable—interpretation of Rule 9(b).112 
Perhaps one could characterize Rule 9(b) as a delegation of Congressional authority, but the rule 
is not limited to federal causes of action, again suggesting that the Court’s invocation of 
Congress’s authority explains too little for Seventh Amendment purposes. 
Besides Congress’s authority to enact pleadings standards, the Tellabs Court provided 
two other bases for its decision. Tellabs suggested, albeit somewhat in passing, that heightened 
pleadings standards do not offend the Seventh Amendment because all factual allegations must 
be accepted as true.113 In addition, the Court stressed that under the majority’s interpretation of 
the strong inference standard, a plaintiff need not plead facts supporting an inference of scienter 
greater than what she would need to prove at trial.114 
Some of the practices approved of in Tellabs were incorporated into the general Rule 8(a) 
standard in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly115 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.116 Specifically, 
Twombly and Iqbal both engaged in a comparative weighing of conceivable inferences to 
                                                 
111 See id. 
112 See Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979). 
113 Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 328. 
114 Id. 
115 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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determine whether an allegation was “plausible.”117 Likewise, Twombly and Iqbal both explicitly 
instruct a court not to accept as true any conclusory allegations.118 Neither decision suggested 
that such practices were constitutionally infirm under the Seventh Amendment. 
Viewed in light of Twombly and Iqbal, Tellabs implies that federal courts are free to 
weigh competing inferences and refuse to accept conclusory allegations as true for purposes of a 
motion to dismiss. On the required strength of the inferences, the Court in Tellabs concluded 
that, at least for causes of action it creates, Congress can require a plaintiff to plead facts creating 
an inference of tortious conduct as likely as any other alternative, non-tortious inference.119 
Although the Tellabs majority did not reach the question, the opinion also suggests that a 
Congressionally-enacted pleadings standard equal to the standard of proof at trial would be 
constitutionally permissible, as long as a court for purposes of the motion accepts all factual 
allegations (i.e., non-conclusory allegations) pleaded in the complaint as true.120  
Since the Court identified two additional reasons for upholding the provision, the 
importance that Tellabs placed on Congress’s authority to enact heightened pleading standards 
for the causes of action it creates may have been overstated. If Congress’s role is necessary, 
Congress may not have the same broad leeway under the Seventh Amendment to enact pleadings 
standards for state causes of actions heard in federal court, and it would be peculiar for the scope 
of Congress’s authority under the Seventh Amendment to depend on such a seemingly irrelevant 
consideration as which sovereign created the cause of action. Assuming that Rule 9(b) is 
constitutional (as most do), one could craft another greater-power-includes-the-lesser argument 
to justify the Rule’s imposition of a heightened pleadings standards on state causes of action, but 
the oddity of the entire exercise implies that the better reading of Tellabs is that the other two 
                                                 
117 See generally 550 U.S. 544 (2007); 556 U.S. 662 (2009); see also Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes 
Rule 8 Pleading Standards on to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 262 (2009). 
118 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n.5; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. 
119 Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 328. 
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protections discussed by the majority are sufficient to uphold a pleadings standard under the 
Seventh Amendment. 
Galloway and Tellabs, therefore, provide two different conceivable ways to structure an 
anti-SLAPP statute within constitutional boundaries. Given Galloway’s approval of judgment as 
a matter of law, an anti-SLAPP statute with a standard of proof equivalent to Rule 56 or Rule 50 
could certainly be lawfully applied in federal court. Yet, a state legislature wishing to enact a 
statute that could be applied in federal court—or Congress if it enacts a federal anti-SLAPP 
statute—may opt for an alternative: After Tellabs, an anti-SLAPP statute could conceivably be 
modeled after a Rule 12(b)(6) motion under the PSLRA, requiring a court to dismiss a complaint 
if the plaintiff does not plead facts creating an inference of tortious conduct that is as likely as 
any opposing inference for each element of her claim. The court would be free to weigh 
inferences against plausible alternatives as long as it accepted as true all non-conclusory 
allegations in the complaint. 
While the Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated against the states, state courts 
have had to address whether anti-SLAPP laws conflict with their state constitutional rights to a 
jury trial. In Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Company, fearing the statute 
would otherwise be unconstitutional, the California Court of Appeal interpreted “a probability” 
in the state’s anti-SLAPP statute to require only that a plaintiff offer “a prima facie case.”121 
Although California courts occasionally equate the anti-SLAPP probability requirement with the 
summary judgment standard, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that it is more akin to the standard 
to obtain judgment as a matter of law because the defendant does not have the burden of 
production.122 
                                                 
121 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 53 (1995). 
122 Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 599 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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In Davis v. Cox,123 the Washington Supreme Court ruled that Washington’s anti-SLAPP 
statute was unconstitutional under its state constitution because the statute’s requirement that a 
plaintiff show “by clear and convincing a probability of prevailing at trial” intruded upon “the 
jury’s essential role of deciding debatable questions of fact.”124 The Washington Supreme Court 
construed the rather unintelligible provision to require a court to engage in improper fact-finding 
and weighing of the evidence.125 That is, unlike at summary judgment, in an anti-SLAPP motion 
a plaintiff would not receive the benefit of every reasonable inference, which the court 
considered essential to the constitutionality of summary judgment.126 If one accepts the 
Washington Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute, this reasoning seems to afford parties 
a right relatively coextensive with the Seventh Amendment. After all, even in Galloway, the 
Supreme Court considered it “essential” that a court make all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the non-moving party.127 
In a perplexing parallel argument, however, Davis opted to “[i]nterpret[] the right of trial 
by jury in light of the petition clause jurisprudence.”128 The Washington Supreme Court 
essentially claimed that since the anti-SLAPP statute allowed suits to be dismissed that did not 
fall within the Noerr-Pennington sham exception, the statute was unconstitutional.129 In contrast, 
summary judgment is constitutional, the court claimed, because it only screens out suits that fall 
within the sham exemption.130 Besides the dubious premise that all claims dismissed on 
summary judgment would satisfy the “objective baseless” prong of the Noerr-Pennington sham 
exception, this argument is disconcerting because the court provided little reasoning for why 
Noerr-Pennington should help delimit the boundaries of the right to a jury trial. Noerr-
                                                 
123 351 P.3d 862 (Wash. 2015). 
124 Id. (emphasis added). 
125 Id. at 871. 
126 See id. at 289. 
127 See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 390. 
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Pennington may protect plaintiffs from liability for filing non-frivolous lawsuits,131 but the 
doctrine does not restrict the procedures that a state can employ to screen out claims that lack 
merit.132 
Perhaps the true lesson of Davis is that a legislature drafting an anti-SLAPP statute 
should avoid fashioning exotic motion standards that prove hard to interpret, much less to apply. 
California’s “a probability” requirement seemed peculiar enough, but subsequent anti-SLAPP 
statutes have tried to sharpen the tone, if not the substance, of an anti-SLAPP review. Passed in 
2011, Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute demands that a plaintiff demonstrate “by clear and specific 
evidence a prima facie case,”133 which the Texas Supreme Court has struggled to elucidate.134 
Under the District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP statute passed in 2010, a party can only withstand 
a motion to dismiss if she is “likely to succeed on the merits,”135 a term also left undefined. The 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not yet evaluated whether this standard comports with 
the Seventh Amendment, which applies to local courts in the District.136 
Like the District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP statute, the proposed federal anti-SLAPP 
statute requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that she is “likely to succeed on the merits,” without 
defining the term.137 Although styled as a “special motion to dismiss,” the legislation, like 
enacted state anti-SLAPP statutes, explicitly contemplates relying not only on the pleadings but 
“affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based.”138 If the bill is passed—an 
admittedly unlikely development—it could be construed to impose a heightened pleadings 
standard, in which case the proposal would likely encounter no constitutional concerns after 
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Tellabs. If, on the other hand, the statute is construed to be an evidentiary standard of proof, the 
federal anti-SLAPP legislation is of more questionable constitutionality. 
III. ERIE’S “MURKY WATERS” AND STATE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES 
While, at least for those provisions similar to California’s, the Seventh Amendment poses 
no apparent obstacle to applying anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court, a much more difficult 
question is whether doing so would be proper under the Erie doctrine. This subject has received 
much scholarly attention,139 and proves to be a reoccurring dispute in federal court. The Ninth 
Circuit has held (and reaffirmed repeatedly) that California’s anti-SLAPP statute applies in 
federal court,140 and the First Circuit has held that Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute likewise 
applies,141 while the D.C. Circuit has recently held that the District’s anti-SLAPP statute does 
not.142 The Fifth Circuit has so far avoided reaching whether Texas’ recently-enacted robust anti-
SLAPP statute applies in its courts.143 While these states’ anti-SLAPP statutes should not be 
carelessly conflated, each of these statutes—as noted earlier—has the same essential features: the 
anti-SLAPP motion, discovery stay, right of interlocutory review, and fee-shifting. Thus, 
although this section focuses on California’s anti-SLAPP law, much of this analysis would apply 
equally to these other anti-SLAPP statutes. 
After Hanna v. Plumer refashioned the Erie doctrine, determining whether there is a 
“direct collision” between a state law and a federal rule is largely determinative. Sibbach 
interpreted the Rules Enabling Act’s constraints on the federal rules very narrowly, while Hanna 
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left Sibbach (and the Constitution) as the only constraints on applying a federal rule where it 
“directly conflicts” with state law.144 The only resource left to federal courts to accommodate 
state interests is to interpret the federal rules remarkably narrowly.145 As a result, Professors 
Burbank and Wolff observe that the Court’s Erie decisions have oscillated between expansive 
and narrow interpretations of the federal rules: 
In an interpretive landscape where “direct collisions” are manufactured, the same 
language has multiple “plain meanings,” and the governing precedent (Sibbach) is 
hopelessly out of step with legal developments, it is no surprise that, since 
Walker, the Justices have lurched from one extreme to the other, giving some 
Federal Rules a scope of application broader than appears plausible—certainly, 
broader than necessary to escape a charge of infidelity to the text—while 
emptying others of content. We strongly suspect that the unifying characteristic of 
these decisions has been an awareness that, although Hanna cleaned up some of 
the mess engendered (or facilitated) by Erie, it did not clean up enough.146 
 
While the Court has not adopted Professors Burbank and Wolff’s separation of powers 
conception of the Rules Enabling Act, the Court has acknowledged that its interpretations of the 
federal rules are guided in part by an intent not to displace other sources of law. In a footnote in 
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., Justice Ginsburg remarked, “Federal courts have 
interpreted the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory 
policies,” citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corporation.147 Even Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority in Shady Grove, observed “we should read an ambiguous Federal Rule to avoid 
‘substantial variations [in outcomes] between state and federal litigation.’”148 
 Notwithstanding this acknowledgment, Shady Grove adopted an expansive textual 
approach to determining what constitutes a direct conflict with a federal rule. In the only section 
to garner the support of a majority of the Court, Justice Scalia stressed that the use of “may” in 
Rule 23(b) “confer[s] categorical permission” for a plaintiff to bring a class action if the 
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strictures of the federal rule are met.149 By providing that class actions “may not be maintained” 
if a claimant seeks statutory damages, New York’s section 901(b), the Court held, “answer[s] the 
same question.”150 
Shady Grove’s textualist approach does not obviously foreclose the application of 
California’s anti-SLAPP in federal court. As four judges on the Ninth Circuit noted in a 
concurrence to a denial of rehearing en banc after Shady Grove, Rule 12 and Rule 56—unlike 
Rule 23—do not provide that a party “may” proceed to trial if she satisfies the rigors of the two 
rules.151 If, as the Court has intimated, there truly is an implicit canon of construing the federal 
rules narrowly to discourage forum shopping and to accommodate state interests, this difference 
alone may be sufficient to conclude that there is no conflict. 
In response, some commentators argue that Rules 12 and 56 “establish the exclusive 
criteria for testing the legal and factual sufficiency of a claim in federal court.”152 While the first 
prong of California’s anti-SLAPP motion (under which a defendant must show that the suit 
arises out of conduct protected under the statute) shares little in common with a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss, the second prong does test the factual sufficiency of a party’s claim, raising 
concerns that it usurps the role of Rules 12 and 56 in circumstances where the defendant satisfies 
her burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute.153 To draw an analogy, suppose that a 
state, fearing a rise in products liability suits, enacts a statute applying only to such suits allowing 
defendants to file a “special motion,” which is no different than a Rule 12(b)(6) motion except 
that it incorporates the Tellabs pleadings standard instead of Twombly-Iqbal. Even if Rule 
12(b)(6) is construed narrowly, such a statute would almost unquestionably directly conflict with 
Rule 8. 
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Of course, California’s anti-SLAPP statute is not just a test of factual sufficiency for a 
limited set of claims; most notably, it includes a discovery stay until the motion is resolved. But 
in Metabolife International, Inc. v. Wornick, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the stay directly 
conflicts with Rule 56(d).154 In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., the Court interpreted Rule 
56(d)—at that time codified as Rule 56(f)—to require that “summary judgment be refused where 
the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his 
opposition.”155 Finding a direct conflict with the anti-SLAPP statute’s “good cause” requirement, 
Metabolife quoted with approval a district court decision stating: “Section 425.16 limits 
discovery and makes further discovery an exception, rather than the rule. Rule 56 does not limit 
discovery. On the contrary, it ensures that adequate discovery will occur before summary 
judgment is considered.”156 Many commentators have interpreted Metabolife as holding that the 
anti-SLAPP discovery stay can never apply in federal court, and the Ninth Circuit seems to 
agree.157 On the other hand, a few district courts in California have expressed reservations about 
Metabolife, questioning whether the stay truly conflicts with Rule 56(d)158 and even refusing to 
grant discovery while an anti-SLAPP motion remains pending unless Rule 56(d) demands 
otherwise.159 
Assuming that the anti-SLAPP statute’s discovery stay does not apply in federal court, as 
Judge Kozinski observed, “the federal court special motion is a far different (and tamer) animal 
than its state-court cousin” because it no longer provides “defendants a quick and painless exit 
from the litigation.”160 A California anti-SLAPP motion applied in federal court, therefore, is 
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more akin to Rules 12 and 56, thereby detracting from the claim that the anti-SLAPP statute does 
not directly conflict with the federal rules.161 
The Court’s partial adoption of state law in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities162 does 
not lessen any argument that the summary judgment and motion to dismiss rules are in direct 
conflict with the anti-SLAPP special motion to strike. In Gasperini, the Court gave effect to New 
York’s stricter standard for reviewing the excessiveness of a jury verdict but—in a departure 
from New York law—tasked the federal district courts with applying the standard in the first 
instance to satisfy the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause.163 The Court avoided any 
direct conflict with the federal rules by concluding that Rule 59 did not prescribe the standard for 
reviewing the excessiveness of a jury award.164 Unlike Rule 59, however, Rules 8, 9, and 56 (as 
well as California’s anti-SLAPP statute) include particular motion standards.165 So, unlike in 
Gasperini, California law could not fill a void typically occupied by interstitial federal common 
law. Even when viewing Gasperini more abstractly as an endorsement of hybridized 
incorporations of state law, the decision serves as little of a model for applying California’s anti-
SLAPP statute without the discovery stay in federal court. For California’s anti-SLAPP statute, 
the debate reduces to whether Rules 12 and 56 constitute the complete set of pretrial procedures 
for testing the adequacy of a plaintiff’s claims. Unlike Gasperini’s delegation of the initial 
review to the district court, removing the anti-SLAPP statute’s discovery stay only sharpens this 
potential conflict by making the anti-SLAPP motion further resemble a pre-trial procedure 
designed primarily to test the legal and factual adequacy of claims. 
One final—but less persuasive—contention against applying California’s anti-SLAPP 
statute in federal court is the California Courts of Appeal’s application of the statute to federal 
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causes of action, albeit without the California Supreme Court ever endorsing the practice.166 The 
principle that the federal rules should be construed narrowly to accommodate California’s 
regulatory interests may seem less convincing if state courts themselves do treat the law—to 
quote Justice Stevens’ Shady Grove concurrence—as “part of [the s]tate’s framework of 
substantive rights or remedies.”167 But, as Justice Ginsburg observed in dissent, such reasoning is 
“out of sync” with the Court’s earlier Erie jurisprudence, which has applied other generally 
applicable state statutes in federal diversity proceedings.168 Indeed, the simplistic dichotomy 
often made between “substantive” and “procedural” statutes overlooks how the same provision 
can have both substantive and procedural objects.169 Tellingly, the plurality did not advance this 
argument in concluding there was a direct conflict between New York’s statute and Rule 23. 
An intriguing alternative argument for applying California’s anti-SLAPP statute in 
federal court would be to contend that the standard is functionally the same as Rule 56.170 After 
all, to save the statute from feared unconstitutionality, California courts have interpreted the 
“probability” standard to be equivalent to summary judgment, although the plaintiff bears the 
burden of production.171 Rule 12(d) allows a court to entertain summary judgment at the 
pleadings stage as long as the parties have “a reasonable opportunity to present all the material 
that is pertinent to the motion.”172 Likewise, Rule 56 itself provides that a party may make a 
motion pursuant to the rule “at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery” absent a 
contrary local rule or court order.173 In effect, one could construe California’s anti-SLAPP 
motion without the benefit of a discovery stay as a summary judgment proceeding with 
mandatory fee shifting, and the Court has recognized that state fee-shifting statutes are 
                                                 
166 See, e.g., Z.F. v. Ripon Unified Sch. Dist., 482 F. App’x 239, 240 (9th Cir. 2012). 
167 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 453. 
168 Id. at 454 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referencing Cohen v. Benefit Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) 
and Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980)). 
169 Id. at 455 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
170 Cf. Makaeff, 736 F.3d at 1183 (Wardlaw, J. and Callahan, J., concurring). 
171 Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 53 (1995). 
172 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). 
173 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b). 
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substantive laws that apply in diversity proceedings.174 But such a construction, although 
preserving the statute’s mandatory fee shifting, would invariably prevent the immediate appeal 
of a denial of an anti-SLAPP motion under the collateral order doctrine, perhaps the greatest 
advantage at present of filing an anti-SLAPP motion in federal court. 
Ultimately, whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court will depend on 
whether a court finds a direct conflict with Rules 12 and 56. Under a “relatively unguided” Erie 
analysis, applying the statute in federal court would certainly serve the twin aims of Erie, and it 
would likely not contravene the “influence—if not the command—of the Seventh 
Amendment.”175 As exemplified by decisions such as Parklane Hosiery Company and Tellabs, 
the Seventh Amendment holds relatively little sway in the Court’s jurisprudence, except for 
militating against the complete displacement of the jury as the ultimate fact-finder.176 
Conversely, if the Court accepts that there is a direct conflict, it would surely not find Rules 
12(b)(6) and 56 violate the Rules Enabling Act. Perhaps the best hope, therefore, for applying 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute in federal court (if the Supreme Court ever addresses the issue) 
is that the Court has been consistently inconsistent in how broadly it construes the federal rules; 
Shady Grove may portend little about how the Court would construe the scope of Rules 12 and 
56. 
CONCLUSION 
 With states increasingly considering robust anti-SLAPP measures, whether such statutes 
should apply in federal proceedings has become an essential question for litigants and courts 
                                                 
174 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 n.31 (1975). 
175 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). 
176 Compare Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333-37 (1979) (approving of offensive non-mutual issue 
preclusion even when it deprives a defendant of ever receiving a trial by jury) with Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536-39 
(refusing, because of “the influence” of the Seventh Amendment, to apply a state decision requiring an affirmative 
defense to be resolved by a judge); see also supra notes 90-120 and accompanying text. Even in Gasperini, a 
decision that only partially adopted state law for fear of impinging the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination 
Clause, the Court narrowly interpreted the amendment by approving of appellate review under an abuse of discretion 
standard of a district court’s decision on a motion to grant a new trial. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 
415, 431-36 (1996). 
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alike. And—given the Washington Supreme Court’s invalidation of its anti-SLAPP statute under 
its state constitutional guarantee of a civil jury and the D.C. Circuit’s refusal to apply the 
District’s robust anti-SLAPP statute in federal court—this question also remains very much 
unanswered. It is thus no surprise that Yelp and other stakeholders that favor applying anti-
SLAPP procedures in federal courts are seeking a federal anti-SLAPP alternative. 
